Hybrids, rights and their proliferation by Birke, Lynda & Michael, Mike
 1 
HYBRIDS, RIGHTS AND THEIR PROLIFERATION 
 




Working out the concept of rights is a complicated business, which at 
least keeps philosophers occupied. Not so long ago, one of us would 
have been denied the right to vote, on the grounds of her gender. Yet 
now, at the turn of the millennium, she is far from sure that we have 
come very far on the question of women's rights. And if women, or 
minorities, or anyone else who is human can sometimes be denied rights, 
then how much more likely that non-humans will be? 
 
Yet extending the concept of rights to non-human animals is increasingly 
being taken seriously. It is debated in academic journals, and forms the 
basis for a growing activism. The publication of books arguing in favour 
of extending rights to at least some animals has proliferated.1 But the 
idea also has its critics. Some criticisms come from those who simply 
wish to keep nonhuman animals out of any moral or political agenda.2 
 
The starting point of this article is the critique of the idea of rights, from 
the perspective of those who are animal advocates3; in particular, we 
start from the premise that the concept of 'rights' is too rooted in 
idealisation of the individual and autonomy. Such idealisation can be 
found in claims about nonhuman animals. But, we would argue, this 
marginalises any concept of relationality. In discussing relationality, we 
aim to address the ways in which relations between human and 
nonhuman animals are embedded in broader networks of inter-relations 
(that range from the evolutionary to the local and cultural). Those 
relations are also a product of the heterogeneous forms of 
communication between individual human and animal, especially in the 





We want, however, to do more than simply acknowledge relationality;  
we also want to suggest that it can serve as another basis for warranting, 
advocating, particular positive relationships with animals. That is to say, 
we aim to provide a narrative - contrasted to that of 'rights' - that 
prioritises our interrelations with animals in such a way that to harm 
'them' would be to harm 'ourselves'. So, while we might be sympathetic 
to studies of the human-animal relationship, we would see these as 
assuming from the outset discrete humans and animals, whereas we are 
aiming to reach a position where we can 'assume at outset' the 
relationality of humans and animals.4 
 
What we want to pursue here is the question of relationality. Other 
authors have noted the importance of relationships and contexts. Ted 
Benton for example, argues that the social context of both human and 
nonhuman cannot be ignored, while Freya Matthews insists that we 
recognise the commensality of humans and nonhumans.5 We, Matthews 
points out, need animal company; but nature - animals- can benefit from 
our company, too. This is not to deny the existence of appalling abuses 
of animals, she argues, but rather acknowledges the mutuality of many 
human/animal interactions. Similarly Barbara Noske6 argues that our 
society is partly based on its relation to, and exploitation of, animals. In 
this paper, we draw upon a quite different literature: we turn to recent 
work in the sociology of scientific knowledge as a starting point. In 
particular, we draw on the work of Bruno Latour, and his analyses of 
'hybrids'.7  We extend this idea to thinking about two examples of human 
relationship and communication with companion animals - with dogs, 
and with horses. These relationships, we argue, can be thought about as 
instances of hybrids, a concept that sees them as more than the sum of 
the parts. We argue that thinking in terms of hybrids of 
human/nonhuman can be useful in enabling us to move beyond some of 
the problems of individualism that beset debates about rights. 
 
In doing so, we are not making claims for all nonhuman animals 
(although others might wish to extend the analysis further); indeed, we 
offer this paper very much as a preliminary exploration. Nor are we 
seeking to undermine the spirit of animal rights philosophy. On the 
contrary, we are committed to it, but do not find it enough. 
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Right is Wrong? 
 
There have been a number of critics of the philosophy of animal rights - 
indeed, of the concept of rights more generally. Perhaps one of the 
strongest criticisms is that notions of rights rely on a profound separation 
and individuality, as well as prioritising rationality.  Benton8 notes, for 
instance, the basis of our understanding, and the idealisation of certain 
rights in the eighteenth century. He points out that while freedom from 
arrest, and freedom of association were specified, the rights of health, 
bodily integrity, nutrition, and so on, were not. This was, moreover, the 
period of history when our modern separation of nature from culture was 
consolidated; it was the sphere of the 'natural' that was omitted from 
these idealised rights - the needs of the body, and the nonhuman world. 
 
Additionally, Benton reminds us of the ways that notions of rights tend 
to obscure 'the social-relational preconditions' for the emergence of the 
'human individual' as bearer of rights, and with particular qualities, 
attributes and abilities 'in virtue of which they are held to have inherent 
value'.9  'Rights', resting as they do upon some version of individualism, 
neglect the many ways in which our experiences are situated.10 
      
Another point needs to be made. The ideas concerning rights have 
'acquired an exaggerated importance as part of the prestige of the public 
sphere and the masculine, and the emphasis on separation and autonomy, 
on reason and abstraction'.11  Separation and autonomy are defined, 
against others - be they nonhuman animals, an ill-defined 'nature', or 
particular excluded groups of human others.  It is through this process of 
exclusion against, that feminism becomes linked to environmental and 
animal causes:  women, nature and nonhuman animals can, in different 
ways and at different times, become others to the story of separation.  
 
Plumwood argues instead for a form of relationality, which, she reminds 
us, is not the same as the identification with nature sometimes implied in 
writing about deep ecology (too close an identification may blind us to 
understanding an other's suffering).12  Nonhuman animals have their own 
societies, but they are also - deeply - in relationship with other animal 
kinds, including humans.  In different ways, they are in relationship to 
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human societies (although there is a world of difference between the 
'domestic animals', socialised into human societies, and the relationship 
of a wild species to humanity).  
 
Relations with nonhumans:  Introducing Hybrids 
 
The word 'hybrid' has many meanings. It can denote a deliberately bred 
cross between, say, two plant species; it might conjure up 'hybrid vigour'.  
Or, it might carry meanings of illicit mixtures, or something defiled by 
being less pure. 
   
The sense of 'hybrid' that we use here draws on the notion of hybrid 
introduced by Bruno Latour, in his work on technoscience. In a recent 
book, Bruno Latour describes what he considers to be two practices 
central to modernity. On the one hand, there is 'translation', which 
'creates mixtures between entirely new types of beings, hybrids of nature 
and culture'.13  On the other, there is also 'purification', the process by 
which we keep humans separated off from nonhumans. Modern Western 
culture tends towards the latter, even while busily creating new mixtures 
(sometimes literally, as in the case of genetically engineered organisms). 
 
One problem with the animal rights position, following Latour, is that the 
concept of rights, while apparently denying separation from other animal 
kinds is firmly rooted in it.  All it seems to do is to move the goalposts, to 
allow some kinds of animals onto the pitch. Life, meanwhile, is awfully 
crowded in the stands and onlookers are policed to stop them invading.  
 
But it is precisely because of that history of purification that the practice 
of sociology or anthropology has ignored all else but human-human 
relationships.14  Not surprisingly then, we are unused to thinking about 
all the nonhuman things that contribute to our world, forming chains of 
associations (that are both material and semiotic) with humans and other 
nonhumans. These are part of our social organisation, behind-the-scenes 
contributors - though of course 'social' becomes a misnomer in this 
context for what we see are 'orderings'15 made up of heterogeneous 
elements.  Expanding on this idea, Bruno Latour makes the point that 
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     We are never faced with objects or social relations, we 
     are faced with chains which are associations of humans (H) 
     and nonhumans (NH). No-one has ever seen a social relation 
     by itself...nor a technical relation...Instead we are 
     always faced with chains which look like this H-NH-H-NH-H- 
     NH...16 
 
The 'nonhuman' here may mean a technical artefact; thus, our 
communication with you, the reader, depends upon technological 
relationships, a complex array of computers, software, and international 
institutions.  But, we want to argue, 'nonhuman' can also mean nonhuman 
animals.  
 
Breaking the boundaries of what counts as human usually results in a 
rush to demonstrate the ways in which animals are not rational, are not 
self-aware, are not intelligent, and so on. Separating ourselves off from 
'nature' characterises the modern period, Latour argues. But the study of 
society or culture has itself developed out of that separation, and it 
specifically excludes all nonhuman influence - be that inanimate or 
animate.  Animals, plants, technical artefacts - all belong to the realm of 
the nonsocial; they can be left to be studied by people (scientists) who 
themselves deny the existence of the social in the descriptions they 
themselves make of the nonsocial. Yet isn't the existence of 'society' 
itself crossing the boundary, depending as it does on much more than 
merely human-human relationships? 
  
Latour's work rests on actor-network theory.  Put briefly, this seeks to 
map out complex networks of humans and nonhumans. The world of 
actor-network theory is partly ruled by the generalized 'principle of 
symmetry' that Bruno Latour and Michel Callon17 have advocated. In 
essence, this principle rejects any a priori distinctions between the 
human and the nonhuman, agent and object, the social and the natural or 
the technological (such distinctions are all too often simply assumed, 
they point out). Thus, what is to count as 'human' or 'natural' or 
'technological' is a matter of struggle between various actors such as 
scientists, policy makers, lay publics and the like.  One relevant example 
of this would be current debates about the moral status of the great apes;  
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there is ongoing political struggle over whether they might be 'counted' 
as animals (part of nature) or at least partly be admitted to the realm of 
the human.18      
 
It is, then, a matter of empirical investigation as to what has emerged as 
'natural', 'artificial' or 'cultural'. More recently, Latour has elaborated this 
view19 to argue that human and nonhumans alike are interfused with all 
manner of nonhumans and humans (the network). Such heterogeneity is 
characteristic of the modern condition (indeed, all conditions). Despite 
our best modernist efforts at denying the 'exchange of properties' 
between - that is, purifying - humans and nonhumans, this heterogeneous 
process of mingling continues apace. What makes this theory different 
from many others is its insistence that nonhuman - technological and 
'natural' - are present in the production of every 'ordering' of relations.  
We are always comprising hybrids, temporary or less temporary 
associations with a vast array of nonhumans. 
 
So, if we are to describe a person's relationship to her dog in these terms, 
then we must speak not only of the human-and-the-dog, but also of the 
other 'allies' that influence that relationship. Whatever other networks she 
engages in, Lynda is also 'enrolled' into certain networks by the dogs she 
lives with. This includes the dogleads and their manufacturers (see 
below), the producers of dog food, dog beds and canine distemper 
vaccine, veterinary surgeons - not to mention the resident cat. To put it in 
terms of hybrids: the hybrid 'Lynda-dog-lead-dog' is constituted through 
and depends upon these various networks. This, of course, is no different 
from the production of 'human individuals' who are an effect of those 
networks that poststructuralists have deconstructed. We shall return to 
the nature of these networks below.  
 
Relationalities and Animals 
 
There has recently been an upsurge in writing about the 'human-animal 
relationship'. New books and journals appear, marking this out as a new 
area of study. That focus is certainly welcome, and makes a refreshing 
change from the assumption that animals are completely separate from 
us. Yet, perusing the contents of those journals is sometimes 
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disappointing. What we find are examples of animals bringing benefits to 
humans, in hospitals, in our homes, to children, to disabled people.   
Some articles may tell us of how human contact can benefit animals 
(usually companion animals); but very few speak of the relationship 
between the two. In what follows, we will explore two examples in order 
to explicate this 'relationality'. But before we embark upon this, a little 
theoretical gloss is in order, if only to clarify what we are attempting to 
do as we switch registers from the local (personal) interactions between 
humans and animals to evolutionary relations.  
 
What is a human? The production of humans relies on particular 
techniques, practices, discourses - what Rose20 calls 'subjectifying 
technologies'. These include what Rose refers to as the psy disciplines 
(psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis), though many 
other practices and technologies also shape 'the human'. The psy 
disciplines, for example, help to give coherence to the notion of a unitary 
individual, as well as contributing to the values and interests that are 
invested in such a figure. 
   
What we are attempting here, albeit tentatively, is to do something 
similar for another character - the human-animal hybrid. So, rather than 
accept the ideas of individualism and rights, we can write a different 
story, that contributes to a concept of human-nonhuman hybridity. We 
could begin, for instance, by pointing to how this figure/character/actor 
is grounded in, and emerges out of, the evolutionary history of 
domestication, or to various pre- and pro-scriptions regarding how such 
human/nonhuman hybrids should behave. 
 
If we thus begin by assuming human/animal relationality - or the 
existence of the hybrid - then we can speak in terms of the co-production 
and mutual emergence of humans and animals.  To discriminate against 
the latter, becomes akin to discriminating against the former, for these, 
indeed, cannot be separated. With this overview in mind, let us proceed 
with storying our hybrid.  
Speaking for - or otherworldly conversations? 
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Animal companions, or pets, have long been known to have therapeutic 
effects upon their owners. In particular, owners claim that 'their animals 
are sensitive to their (the owners') moods and feelings'.21  The processes 
of communication that are evident here are clearly not linguistic, but 
vocal, visual and tactile. However, animals' lack of linguistic ability may 
be one of their prime assets in that animals cannot, as a consequence 
judge, betray or criticise - their feelings for the human are apparently 
uncontingent. But this intimacy does not preclude humans from 'speaking 
for' their animal companions.  As Sanders notes: 
 
     Because the animal is 'mute', caretakers often find 
     themselves in situations in which they must 'speak for' 
     their nonhuman companions.  In so doing, they make use of 
     a rich body of knowledge derived from an intimate 
     understanding of the animal-other built up in the course of 
     day-to-day interactional experience. Dog owners commonly 
     give voice to what they perceive to be their animals' 
     mental, emotional, and physical experiences.22 
 
Such patterns of 'speaking for' suggests a process of retelling, by humans, 
of their own and animals' experiences with the aid of more or less 
familiar stories. But that does not mean we should not take them 
seriously. 
 
Indeed, we would argue that there is a serious problem with a sociology 
which persistently ignores animal others, for it remains rooted in the 
persistent dualism of nature and culture. Many animal 'others' are deeply 
integral to human societies - indeed, as Benton argues23, they are partly 
constitutive of our society in many ways.  But understanding this does 
not mean that we have to objectify them, or even to accord them human 
status (as seems to be implied in some formulations of rights). Feminist 
historian of science Donna Haraway, reflecting on these issues, suggests 
that: 
 
     The last thing 'they' (animals) need is human subject 
     status, in whatever cultural-historical form...  We need 
     other terms of conversations with animals, a much less 
     respectable undertaking.  The point is not new 
     representations, but new practices, other forms of life 
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     rejoining humans and nothumans.24 
 
Out of this emerges, Haraway hopes, a new form of human being: 
 
     Once the world of subjects and objects is put into 
     question, that paradox concerns the congeries, or curious 
     confederacy, that is the self, as well as selves' relations 
     with others.  A promising form of life, conversation defies 
     the autonomization of the self, as well as the 
     objectification of the other.24  
 
So, what happens as we engage in those non-linguistic conversations 
with animal others is a diffusion of the (human) self. The human identity 
that emerges from these conversations is no longer linear, but is realised 
through all forms of communication. We want to emphasise that that 
process must include nonverbal communications, with nonhuman 
actors.25 
 
We might say that animals are mute only if we remain deaf. As Kath 
Smart has shown26, dogbreeders believe themselves to be in conversation 
with their animals, and sometimes even under scrutiny or surveillance - a 
perception familiar to anyone who works closely with animals in similar 
ways. That perception implies an agency, that the dogs are somehow 
enrolling the humans into the association.  The idea that there is co-
agency between (some) nonhuman animals and humans is not, of course, 
new to animal trainers and breeders.  But it is not part of the descriptions 
of the world to be found in academic disciplines; there, the purification 
of human culture - to which Latour refers - is endemic. Humans have 
their own society; animals belong to the other side of a heavily policed 
boundary (within the natural sciences). 
 
But the boundaries tend to break down, as Latour emphasised (see note 
7). For example, in contrast to the familiar story that humans 
'domesticated' dogs in prehistory, Budiansky27 contends that animals 
such as dogs 'chose' us. They were, he suggests, drawn to human 
communities, to the shelter, food and protection they might offer. In that 
case, the domestication of dogs 'is an evolutionary phenomenon rather 
than a human invention'. Dogs, we might say, have a long history of 
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enrolling humans, just as we have one with them. Both have adapted to 
each other, and both are (sometimes) in deeply mutual communication. 
Here, we have a story that crosses the boundary of 'natural science' 
(evolution, animals) and 'sociology' (human society). 
 
One way in which human-dog communication is manifest occurs when 
we observe a person 'taking her dog for a walk'. Usually, this involves a 
technological artefact - the doglead. This object, however, mediates 
exchanges between the human and dog, and blurs the site of agency. 
Who is the user - human or dog? Who does the configuring - animal, 
lead, or human? For example, dogs may have their own agendas; 
sometimes, these fit with human agendas - sometimes, they do not, as is 
often the case with Lynda and her three dogs-plus-dogleads. Agency, in 
that case, is a complicated business. 
  
Dogs, indeed, may resist human desires (witness the reluctance to enter 
the veterinary surgery, or the desire to jump off the table once there). But 
even when they cooperate, agency is evident. In other words, dogs may 
be committed to a certain 'contract' and will bring their 'handlers' into 
line. But also, the fulfilment and maintenance of the contract is 
continuously performed through communication, at many levels, 
between human and dog. 
  
This process of negotiation is partly conducted through the medium of 
the doglead - especially so in urban areas,28 where it is the hybrid of 
human-doglead-dog who must negotiate the tricky terrain. The doglead 
then permits a mutuality - both human and dog look out for objects or 
events on the other's behalf. In some cases, the dog's agency is more 
prominent, as is the case with guide dogs. Stories abound among those 
working with 'service animals' of the animal acting heroically (leaping 
under the wheels of a sliding wheelchair, for instance) - agency, indeed. 
 
We turn now to another example - that of human/horse interactions.  
Again, the popular image is one of humans using and dominating horses 
(as exemplified in the rather misleading phrase, to break a horse).  Partly 
for that reason, there are some in the animal rights movement who 
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consider that it is morally wrong to ride horses. But this position again 
plays down any mutuality.  
  
Here, the 'hybrid' we might describe consists of human-bridle-horse.  
Communication between the two living entities takes place partly 
through the medium of the bridle or halter, and partly kinaesthetically - 
through movement and its sensing. As with dogs, there is a continuous 
subtle play of conversation: for horses are large animals and cannot be 
dominated (even very small ones, like Shetland ponies, can beat puny 
human strength). They will, however, agree to converse. 
 
Now it is also true that there are many, many instances of abuse by 
humans - a breaking of the contract, as it were. Such acts may, in part, 
reflect a belief in domination. But to what extent can humans truly 
dominate an animal, especially if it is the size of many horses? On the 
contrary, 'learning to ride' means not only acquiring certain physical 
skills, but also learning a new, largely tactile, language. Through that 
means, we can communicate with the horse. But the horse also has 
agency; it can - easily - refuse to work with us. Certainly, if a horse does 
not want to go over a jump, it will not - just as it will show agency by 
resistance if, say, a human mishandles the intervening technology (by 
grabbing at the reins and hurting the horse's mouth). 
 
There are certainly some among animal rights activists who believe that 
it is morally wrong to 'make' horses jump obstacles - especially in 
contexts where there is a risk of injury. There have, as a result, been 
demonstrations at several international equestrian events. Whatever the 
merits of their claim, it is somewhat ironic that demonstrations focus on 
the 'showpiece' events, for it is there that the 'hybrids' are policed most 
strongly.  The literature of the 'horse world' relies on a rhetoric of 
welfare, in which the horse's needs are paramount.29 Human-bridle-horse 
hybrids must follow particular rules, at least in public arenas. To an 
extent, the horse takes part in this rule-following.  
 
Domestic animals, such as dogs and horses, are socialised into a society.   
By that we mean not only their own society (the local community of dogs 
at the breeders, or the horses at the stud), but also into human society.  
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What we should perhaps be insisting on, indeed, is a notion of a hybrid 
society, consisting of humans along with nonhumans. Just like a human 
infant, a young animal must be socialised into that hybrid society: both 
kinds of infants must 'learn the rules' about other members of society. 
 
Part of the prevailing view that nonhuman animals are domesticated by 
us is the claim that, underneath the veneer of domestication, there is a 
'wild' animal, driven by archaic instincts. This additive view, of the thin 
veneer of culture overlaying baser wildness, fails to address the social 
embeddedness of domestic animals.  Yet we project our social 
expectations onto domestic animals, and sometimes they behave 
accordingly. For example, within the world of 'horse people' (a curiously 
hybrid phrase, to be sure!), there are many humans who will avoid mares, 
in the belief that they are less 'trainable'; stallions, too,  are often thought 
to be 'difficult'.  Yet - if true - how much of that is due to human 
expectations and to socialisation? If humans socialise the animal into a 
role of being 'difficult' (that is, less susceptible to mutual 
communication), then that is what it will become. So, too, may human 
children.  
 
Returning to the theme of animal rights, we have argued that one 
important problem with rights is its emphasis on individuality, rather 
than relationality. This in turn is deeply entwined with the historically 
contingent separation of 'nature' from 'culture' in the West. That 
separation then excludes the place of (at least some) animals in society 
and culture,  and their interests in maintaining that place. 
 
The problems of the ways that animals may be treated today by humans 
arise in large part from their relegation to the (inferior) world of nature. 
That is not to say that prior to the modern period, animals were treated 
well; they were not. But a characteristic of modernity is the deep anxiety 
to police the boundaries of human culture (or even of Western culture); 
as Latour puts it (note 7), we are obsessed with purification.  One 
manifestation of this is our constant need in the West to return nonhuman 
animals to their 'place' in nature. Because of this, we tend to have 
difficulties with those nonhuman animals whose place is by our sides; 
are they in nature, or do they belong to culture? 
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Yet the very same culture so preoccupied with purifying its boundaries 
also works to transgress them. Science, for example, does both. The 
practice of science assumes a separation from nature (hence the supposed 
objective stance, by which scientists claim to 'know' nature, while 
denying their own cultural contingencies); but simultaneously, it denies 
separation (evolutionary theory and genetics) and even creates boundary-





Our use of the idea of hybrids is deliberate.  We are not necessarily 
advocating a literal interbreeding of people and other animals (which is 
another debate).  Rather, we want to use the concept of hybridity for two 
related reasons.  The first is that the notion of a hybrid implies boundary-
crossing and mixing - if not literally, then certainly at a conceptual level.  
This confounds issues of what is human? or what is animal? or even 
what is an individual?  At the very least, that confounding should help to 
destabilise that tired old division between nature and culture. 
 
Hybrids also open up a space, secondly, to think about relationality. Now 
we have used the term hybrid to emphasise the conjoint nature of the 
hybrid, and its co-agency.  As critics of the nature/culture or 
nature/nurture dualisms have often bewailed, it is all too easy to invoke 
some kind of addition (nurture adds onto the nature base), or a simple 
interaction (A can affect B, which can affect A30). But even this can still 
be split apart - indeed, that splitting is often required by the very methods 
by which we might study something.  So, we might choose to study 'the 
human/dog relationship' as a function of doggy effects on humans (such 
as reduction of heart rate if you go patting a dog), or perhaps of human 
effects on dogs (selective breeding, say). 
   
Yet what is missing from, or played down by, this kind of account is the 
mutuality; both human and dog become changed, and become more than 
simple person-plus-dog. By trying to think about this chimerical being as 
a hybrid, we want to emphasise that 'more than'.  Lynda is a part of many 
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human networks, but also at times comes together with dogs and horses 
to create temporary hybrids:  these, in turn, generate other networks of 
humans and nonhumans. 
   
One extreme position we have encountered among animal rights activists 
is the idea that it is wrong to 'keep pets', that the animals should be free 
to wander and to 'be themselves', that they have intrinsic rights to 
freedom.  But in this specific case - companion animals - such a stance 
would deny their relationships with humans.  It is also based on a highly 
idealised notion of 'freedom', for who among us humans has such 
freedom?  Aren't we all constrained by, among other things, our 
relationships with other beings?  Invoking individual 'rights' seems to 
gloss over those constraints, and to ignore the very relationality on which 
we (and many nonhuman animals) base our social lives. 
 
Now in seeking to emphasise that relationality, we recognise its 
limitations when it comes to other human uses of animals. We want here 
to use the idea with regard to companion animals. When it comes to 
intensive farming, the rhetoric of rights is probably more politically 
useful;  even the more liberal welfare lobby talk about ensuring that 
certain animal needs are met. 
 
The use of animals in scientific experimentation is another area where to 
insist on at least some rights may be a useful political strategy.  Thus,  
those involved in reform or working for welfare might argue that 
laboratory animals have a right to a certain amount of space in their 
living quarters.  Even so, we should remember that the practice of using 
animals itself seems to require that scientists' separate themselves off 
from the animals, that they psychologically and culturally deny any 
relationality. Indeed, on those occasions where laboratory animals 
become individually incorporated into relationships with people (as 'lab 
pets', say), then they usually are 'saved' from the experiments.31  
 
Much modern theorising about evolution seems to stress individuality (or 
even to shift it onto selfish genes).  Thus, despite the appeal of Darwin's 
ideas to those of us who see kindred spirits in the nonhuman world, we 
inherit a cultural tendency towards atomism. Yet there are also 
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evolutionary theorists who do not see such atomism in the natural world, 
who emphasise instead the co-evolution of ecologically interrelated 
species.32  Rather than seeing individual species or populations as rather 
passively adapted to a (largely inert) environment,  this reformulation 
insists on mapping out the networks of interrelationships and effects. 
Indeed, an animal's or a species' environment is constituted by other 
organisms, including humans - hybrids aplenty. 
 
And there, to return to Val Plumwood's analysis of ideas of nature, lies 
the difficulty at the heart of rights theory. For while we might speak of 
the 'rights' of animal A to roam free 'around its environment', that is to 
ignore the 'rights' of other organisms. To take the oft-used example, 
whose rights should we then heed, the sheep or the wolf? 
  
We have borrowed here from the concepts of hybridity and actor-
networks, developed in the literature on sociology of scientific 
knowledge. Their relevance to a discussion of our relationship to animals 
is twofold - they explicitly problematise the separation of nature from 
culture, and they relocate humans individuals back into networks of other 
actors including nonhumans.  Whether we speak of events over 
evolutionary time, or seek to describe human relationships with (certain) 
animals now, any rhetoric of individualism is limited.  
 
Instead, we must try to develop a relational framework, and to develop an 
ethical stance from that. It is not necessarily in the best interests of 
companion animals (at least) to talk of their individual 'rights to roam 
free' (where?). Nor is it necessarily to deny them some intrinsic freedom 
to follow their instincts - a belief which maintains the notion that 
nonhuman animals are 'in nature' in ways that we are not.  
   
Once we think in terms of hybrids between culturally specific humans,  
nonhuman nature, and even technical artefacts (this, it should be noted, 
could include ecosystems), then perhaps we can develop a language of 
interests that apply to the hybrid. Among other things, hybrids are 
conjoint entities: they are not simply one entity sitting alongside another. 
As a consequence, hurting one part of a hybrid hurts the rest.33  Perhaps 
this move will not always work to protect the interest of either humans or 
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nonhumans.34  But, we want to insist, seeing individuals as bearers of 
atomistic rights does not work well either, not least because it ignores 
our collective social networks. 
 
We need, to return to Donna Haraway's insights, to develop new forms of 
conversation with nonhuman others, to explore and celebrate our joint 
kinship.35  In so doing, our highly overdeveloped sense of selfhood 
might begin to diminish; we might even allow a breaching of our 
boundaries. Lest that sound too anthropocentric, nonhuman animals 
stand to benefit; for their relationships with less egocentric and territorial 
humans are likely to be more welcoming and communicative. To speak 
of their 'rights' seems only to reinforce our own selves and boundaries.  




Tam, Lisa and Penny very kindly came to an agreement not to interfere 
too much in the hybrid creation of various drafts of this on Lynda's 
computer.  This was, however, totally dependent upon frequent cuddles 
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